Abstract Using methods of abstract logic and the theory of valuation, we prove that there is no paraconsistent negation obeying the law of double negation and such that ¬(a ∧ ¬a) is a theorem which can be algebraized by a technique similar to the Tarski-Lindenbaum technique.
C1 leads to classical logic or trivializes it. (However, Mortensen [15] and da Costa, Béziau, and Bueno [8] have presented extensions of C1 which admit nontrivial congruences.) The question whether the replacement theorem is compatible or not with the idea of paraconsistency is one of the significant remaining problems in paraconsistent logic (Béziau [2] ).
2 Basic framework Generalizing the definition of Suszko (cf. [3] ), we consider an abstract logic (or simply, a logic) as a structure L = G; C n where G is a structure of domain S and C n a closure operator on S (i.e., for every subset A and B of S,
. Thus, G is not necessarily an absolute free algebra as in standard propositional logics: it can, for example, be a partial infinitary algebra or a relational structure. The result that we will prove here can be applied to first-or second-order language and even to non-well-founded language as described by Lismont in [12] , because it does not depend on specific features of the structure G, which is the mathematical expression of the language.
Given a family F of subsets of a set A, it is easy to see that the function ϕ on It is easy to prove that the class of ABS for a given logic is not empty. This justifies the study of a logic from the point of view of its class of ABS, called the theory of valuation and developed by da Costa (for an overview on the subject see [6] and [7] ).
Preliminary results
A negation in an abstract logic L = G; C n is a unary operator ¬ on the domain S of G with certain properties. Until now there has been no agreement concerning these properties, but it is common, for example, to call a negation an operator not obeying the law of excluded middle, such as that involved in intuitionistic logic. Thus, it is not necessarily absurd to call a negation an operator not obeying the law of noncontradiction.
A negation ¬ is paraconsistent if and only if there exists a in S such that C n {a, ¬a} = S (a paraconsistent logic is a logic with such a negation). We will state an easy result establishing a connection between this definition and the intuitive traditional formulation of the law of noncontradiction (a proposition and its negation cannot both be true) and which will also be useful for the proof of the central theorem.
Before doing so we need two more definitions. A bivaluation β in an ABS for the logic L is singular if and only if there exists an object a in S such that β(a) = β(¬a) = 1. A singular bivaluation is trivial if and only if it is the function which gives the value 1 to any object of S.
Proposition 3.1 A logic is paraconsistent if and only if in all its ABS there is a singular nontrivial bivaluation.
Given a logic L = G; C n , two objects a and b of S are logically equivalent (notation: a ∼ = b) if and only if C n a = C n b. Let us say that an object a is a theorem if and only if C n a = C n ∅. Obviously we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2 If a and b are theorems, then a ∼ = b.
Moreover, given S an ABS for L, we have this proposition.
Proposition 3.3 a ∼ = b if and only if for any β of S, β(a) = β(b).
An idempotent negation ¬ of L is a negation such that for every object, a ∼ = ¬¬a.
An algebraizable negation is a negation ¬ verifying: for every a and b, if a ∼ = b then ¬a ∼ = ¬b. An algebraizable logic is a logic such that logical equivalence is a congruence on it. It is clear that a logic in which there is a nonalgebraizable negation is not algebraizable.
In the case where the structure G is an absolute free algebra or something similar, such as a first-order language, it is easy to see that a logic is algebraizable in the above sense if and only if the theorem of replacement (as formulated, for example, by Kleene in [11] ) holds. In the general case, this notion of algebraization is equivalent to the general replacement theorem formulated by Curry and MacLane (see [9] and [13] ).
Proposition 3.4 Given an idempotent algebraizable negation, two objects are logically equivalent if and only if their negations are logically equivalent.
4 Main result A full paraconsistent negation is a paraconsistent negation such that ¬(a ∧ ¬a) is a theorem. Here we take ∧ to denote the standard conjunction, that is, Proof: Let L be a logic with a full idempotent paraconsistent negation. Given S an ABS for L, due to Proposition 3.1, there is a singular nontrivial bivaluation β of S, such that β(a) = β(¬a) = 1 for one object a, and we have β(a ∧ ¬a) = 1.
As ¬ is a full paraconsistent negation, ¬(a ∧ ¬a) is a theorem, and given any object b, ¬(b ∧ ¬b) is also a theorem; therefore, due to Proposition 3.2, ¬(a ∧ ¬a) ∼ = ¬(b ∧ ¬b). Now, due to Proposition 3.4, a ∧ ¬a ∼ = b ∧ ¬b, therefore, due to Proposition 3.3, β(b ∧ ¬b) = β(a ∧ ¬a) = 1, thus β(b) = β(¬b) = 1. This shows that β is trivial, which is absurd.
Applications of the theorem
The paraconsistent negations of Asenjo's calculus of antinomies (cf. [1] ), of D'Ottaviano and da Costa's logic J3 (cf. [10] ), and of Priest's logic LP (cf. [16] ) are defined with Łukasiewicz's L3 table for negation taking 1 2 and 1 as designated. It is easy to see that, together with the standard conjunction (included in these logics), this defines idempotent full paraconsistent negations. Therefore these negations are not algebraizable.
Moreover, due to our result, it is easy to see that there are no extensions of Asenjo's calculus, J3 and LP, in which their negations are algebraizable and still paraconsistent.
6 Generalization of the theorem This theorem depends on the definition of an abstract logic L as a structure G; C n which is quite general; however, alternative, more general definitions can be proposed such as a structure G; X n where X n is a relation on P (S) × P (X) obeying axioms extending those of C n as studied by Scott in [18] .
Our result can be extended without difficulty to such a structure.
We can also generalize this result to the case where we deal not with a closure operator but an equivalence connective, in order to satisfy relevantists who think that the closure operator is wrong (cf. Routley in [17] ).
